You cannot verify encryption by looking at a lock screen, but you can check documentation, behaviour and edge cases. Ask what is encrypted and with which key, test the unlock and fallback, check exports and storage use, and look for independent review. Treat missing answers as a risk.

What kind of evidence are you reading?

This is a guide to evaluating claims, not an independent security audit of Photo Vault or the other apps mentioned. A working lock screen and a named cipher are useful clues, but neither proves the whole storage and recovery design.

Different evidence supports different conclusions
EvidenceWhat it can establishWhat it does not establish
Store listing or privacy policyWhat the developer publicly claimsWhat the installed app actually does
Public code or design paperHow the published component is intended to workThat the complete released app matches it or has been independently assessed
A trial on your phoneObserved behavior for that version, device and settingsEncryption correctness or absence of hidden data leaks
Independent assessment reportFindings within a named version, scope and methodologyThat later releases or excluded components have the same properties

Documentation checks

  • Is the encrypted data listed precisely: media, thumbnails, metadata?
  • Is the key source explained: user credential, device, server, built-in?
  • Is recovery explained, including what the company can and cannot do?
  • Is there an independent assessment, with date and scope?
  • Does the assessment name the reviewer, tested version, dates, covered components, exclusions, findings and whether fixes were retested?

Behaviour checks you can do

Use disposable copies and record the app version, iOS version and settings. Keep your originals and working installation. Check for erase-on-failure or duress settings before trying incorrect credentials; skip that test if its consequences are unclear.

  • Set the lock, switch away and back: does it lock again?
  • Try device authentication: does it accept the passcode?
  • If documented as non-destructive, observe a small number of wrong-code attempts; do not keep guessing or try to bypass a lock.
  • Export a test photo: what resolution and metadata does it have?
  • Inspect storage use in iPhone Settings while the phone is accessible; size alone cannot tell you whether the files are encrypted.

What you cannot verify easily

Whether files in the app container are encrypted, and with what key, requires access to the files and expertise. That is why clear documentation and independent review matter.

OWASP MASVS separates storage, cryptography, authentication, network communication and platform interaction into distinct assessment areas. An encryption check alone does not cover exports, logs, temporary files, backup behavior or authentication bypasses. This checklist does not confer MASVS compliance.

Read the methodology before trusting the headline

Vaultaire’s page titled “A 2026 Security Audit” describes a review of labels, policies, architecture claims and public incidents, and says it did not perform live network capture. That scope can inform questions; it cannot establish traffic that was not observed.

Obscura’s own safety page distinguishes its published encryption component from the rest of the app and says no outside security firm has audited the app or code. Publishing a component enables review; it is not evidence that an independent review has already happened.

Apply the same standard to old vulnerability reports: match the product, platform, version and date. A historical finding is a reason to investigate the current release, not a verdict on every app with a similar name.

Photo Vault’s answers

These answers describe PhotoVault: Encrypt & Compress 1.0 on iPhone and iPad. Secure Share (.pvsecure) exports use a separate password or pattern credential; verify exported copies in an independent destination before deleting originals. A final assessment must include imports, retained original resources, previews, exports, migration failures and recovery—not only the encrypted archive at rest.

  • Encrypted by the app: new and successfully migrated media archives and current metadata writes, using AES-GCM and an installation key in the device-only Keychain.
  • Outside encrypted archive storage: readable exports and temporary working files. Old archives require successful migration. Runtime verification remains pending.
  • Lock: password, pattern or device authentication with passcode fallback; attempt limits after five failures.
  • Recovery: none from Arte Soft; no account.
  • Independent review: none published.

Illustrative example

Evaluating two apps, a reader finds that one documents per-file keys derived from a passphrase and the other only says “military-grade”. The first has given them something to check; the second has not.

Sources & further reading

Keep exploring