An app lock controls access through the interface; media encryption protects stored archive contents with a key. The new Photo Vault source has both, but its password or pattern does not derive the archive key. A random installation key is held in this device’s Keychain. New archives and successful migrations use the encrypted format.
Four layers to keep apart
- iOS device protection: your passcode protects the whole device and its file system when locked.
- Photo Vault app lock: password, pattern or device authentication before the gallery opens.
- Metadata encryption: current indexes use AES-GCM under a random installation key in the device-only Keychain; older indexes require migration.
- Media encryption: new and successfully migrated archives use per-file 256-bit keys and authenticated AES-GCM blocks. The installation key protects the media keys.
What each layer stops
The app lock checks access before showing the gallery. Its usefulness depends on the configured route: system authentication can accept the device passcode, while the app password or pattern is separate.
The new archive format protects stored media and index data with encryption. The installation key is random for each installation, not a constant embedded in every copy of the app. It is available through the Keychain on this device while unlocked.
These layers do not promise protection on a compromised device. Media is decrypted for viewing; some operations use temporary working files, and exports create readable files. An old archive needs successful migration before the new storage protection applies.
Why your password is not the key
Photo Vault turns your password or pattern into a slow, salted verifier stored in the Keychain. It checks a guess against that verifier and opens the app if it matches. The verifier is not used to encrypt or decrypt photos. The current app also has no recovery-phrase feature. A verifier and a media-encryption key serve different purposes.
Questions to ask any vault
- Which data is encrypted: media, thumbnails, metadata, all of them?
- Where does the key come from: your credential, the device, or the app itself?
- Is the key the same for every user?
- What remains readable if the app’s files are copied off the device?
Choosing based on your risk
Choose based on the access and recovery paths you need. The new source provides local archive encryption, but the key is marked ThisDeviceOnly and there is no app-managed recovery service. Do not assume copying encrypted files to another phone will make them readable. Keep verified independent originals or exports; migration and restoration still need final-build tests.
Either way, think about other copies: originals in Photos, iCloud, shared messages and backups.