For any cloud photo service, check who holds the encryption keys, which data is end-to-end encrypted, what the service analyses, how sharing works, how long deleted items are kept, and how your account is protected. These determine privacy more than storage size or price.

Six questions

  • Keys: does the provider hold them, or only your devices?
  • Coverage: which data types are end-to-end encrypted, and which are not?
  • Analysis: does the service analyse photos on its servers?
  • Sharing: do shared albums or links change encryption?
  • Deletion: how long are deleted items recoverable?
  • Account: is two-factor authentication available and on?

Worked example: iCloud

  • Keys: Apple by default; trusted devices with Advanced Data Protection.
  • Exceptions: Shared Albums do not support it.
  • Deletion: Photos normally offers up to 30 days in Recently Deleted. Earlier permanent deletion and Apple’s documented iCloud-storage exceptions can remove that recovery option.
  • Account: two-factor authentication on Apple Accounts.
  • Availability: new UK users cannot enable Advanced Data Protection; check eligibility and recovery before relying on it.

Google Photos: inspect sharing and connected services

Google documents encryption in transit and at rest. That statement alone does not establish that only your devices hold the decryption keys.

Google says Photos does not sell your photos or use them for ads, while describing an exception when you choose to make Photos data available to other Google services that support ads. Check connected-service settings as well as the Photos app itself. Face grouping is another separate control.

A Google Photos album link can be forwarded. Removing a person does not block their link access while link sharing remains enabled. To make an album private, its owner must remove collaborators and disable link sharing. This cannot recall a copy someone already saved.

Proton Drive: encrypted files still have service metadata

Proton’s policy states that file contents, filenames, folder names and thumbnails are end-to-end encrypted. It also lists information available to the service, including creation and modification times, permissions, uploader identity and encrypted file size.

Sharing URLs have their own activity metadata. Proton says it can access shared content if someone supplies the sharing URL and any required password. Protect a sharing link as an access credential.

Turning off photo backup leaves previously uploaded photos in Proton Drive. Moving a file to trash is not permanent deletion; retained file versions also need separate attention when versioning is enabled.

Dropbox: distinguish standard storage from encrypted team folders

Dropbox documents AES-256 encryption at rest and TLS in transit for its standard service. Its advanced key-management feature is separate from end-to-end encrypted team folders; do not treat the names as interchangeable.

End-to-end encrypted team folders are available on Business Plus, Advanced and Enterprise teams. Dropbox says folder members hold the access keys, with recovery keys managed by admins. This is not a default protection for every personal photo upload.

The team-folder documentation lists important limits: metadata remains readable, previews and shared links are unavailable, and the mobile app does not support these folders; mobile access uses the website. Local downloaded files need their own device protection. Check the exact folder and client before moving a photo workflow.

OneDrive: Personal Vault adds access controls

Microsoft documents TLS in transit and per-file encryption at rest, with master keys in Azure Key Vault. This is service-managed encryption, rather than a claim that only your devices hold the keys.

Personal Vault requires additional identity verification, locks automatically and blocks direct sharing. A file must be moved out of the vault before it can be shared. These controls can reduce accidental access, but should not be described as end-to-end encryption.

Microsoft also documents limits worth checking: opened files may leave names in application Recent lists, and deleted vault files in the online recycle bin become visible when the vault is unlocked. A locked view is not evidence of permanent deletion.

Amazon Photos: review tagging and family sharing

Amazon’s Photos terms describe image analysis for object, scene and people tagging. You can disable the applicable tagging features in account settings; the terms say this stops storing those tags and tagging new uploads. Feature availability varies by location.

A Family Vault owner controls its tagging settings. Members can share contributed files with people outside the vault or group. Check both the organizer’s settings and who can redistribute a photo before contributing it.

Amazon’s published terms allow service access to files for operating and improving the service. Disabling tagging is therefore not a promise that the provider cannot access the photos. Amazon’s UK recovery guide says trashed photos are permanently deleted after 90 days; earlier permanent deletion removes that recovery option.

Ente: encrypted photo metadata and recovery responsibilities

Ente documents encryption on your device before upload, including photo metadata such as capture time, location and descriptions. This describes protection of library content, not anonymity of your account or internet connection.

Its recovery guidance distinguishes a still-signed-in device from being signed out everywhere. A signed-in device can help reset a forgotten password. Otherwise, keep the recovery key available: if you are signed out everywhere and lose both password and recovery key, Ente cannot recover the data.

If you also use Ente Auth with the same account, avoid making your only sign-in code inaccessible inside that same locked account. Ente’s account guide explains the dependency and recovery options; prepare them before relying on the backup.

Compare the action, not just the label

Checks before trusting a privacy setting
ActionQuestion to resolve
Turn off backup or syncDoes this stop new transfers, or remove existing cloud files too?
Remove a recipientCan they still use an enabled link or retain an earlier download?
Delete an itemIs it in trash, a previous version, another device or an exported copy?
Enable encryptionWhich content and metadata are covered, and how will recovery work?
Connect another serviceWhat data will it receive and which separate privacy settings apply?

Try a small sample before moving your library

Use non-sensitive test photos to check upload, download, sharing removal and deletion behavior. Open the downloaded files and compare the formats and metadata you need. Record which account and devices participated so you know where copies remain.

These are documented examples from seven services, not an exhaustive provider ranking or a test of every setting. Select a service around your recovery and sharing needs, then verify those workflows before moving irreplaceable originals.

Where Photo Vault fits

Photo Vault has no app-managed cloud archive sync, but that does not establish that device backups exclude its data. Backup inclusion and archive restoration remain unverified. Imports also leave existing cloud copies unless a separate deletion succeeds.

The new local archive format uses AES-256-GCM with keys protected by a device-only installation key. This is not an end-to-end encrypted cloud service. Location-name lookup can send stored coordinates to Apple Maps while the gallery is active.

Sources & further reading

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